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Family businesses carry the weight of economic wealth creation in most 
economies. In the U.S. alone, family businesses account for 80 to 90 percent of the 18-
million business enterprises in the United States, and 50 percent of the employment and 
GNP. In many ways, the family business is synonymous with the entrepreneurial 
organization as many were started as a means to provide for the financial well being of 
the founder's family. Founders who went on to build family empires started many of 
today's large corporations (e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Dupont, and Seagrams). Still, we know 
relatively little about the issues peculiar to a family business, such as the process and 
impact of succession planning. Yet, no recurring event in the life of the family firm is 
more critical to survival than the transfer of power from the incumbent to the successor. 
Organizations are especially susceptible to loss of vision and purpose during periods of 
CEO transition, as the leaders who helped shape the vision are replaced by others who 
may not share the same values and abilities. This study addresses the importance of 
understanding business succession planning by proposing and empirically verifying a 
model of succession planning and firm effectiveness in the family business. It links 
aspects of succession planning and successor preparation to the effectiveness of transition 
and from performance. The model depicts multiple interactive relationships, with 
emphasis placed not only on the planning and process-specific but also on successor-
specific factors that lead to effectiveness. 
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Corporate Governance and Management Succession in Family Businesses  
Introduction  
Family businesses carry the weight of economic wealth creation in most 
economies.  In the U.S. alone, family businesses account for 80 to 90 percent of the 18-
million business enterprises in the United States, and 50 percent of the employment and 
GNP in the economy (Morris, 1997; Lansberg, Perrow and Rogalsky, 1988).  In Canada, 
this figure is higher with 80% of the companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange 
closely held in family trusts or the founders’ hands (Leighton and Thain, 1997).  In 
Singapore and Hong Kong, the numbers are similar as many of the local business 
enterprises that have recently gone public were started by overseas Chinese entrepreneurs 
in the post-war period 40 years ago.  In Taiwan the small and medium-sized family 
enterprise accounts for more than 98.5% of companies, 80% of employment and 47% of 
the total economy (The Economist, Nov 7 1998).   
In many ways, the family business is synonymous with the entrepreneurial 
organization as many were started as a means of exploiting opportunity for wealth 
creation in order to provide for the financial well being of the founder’s family.  Many 
large global corporations today (e.g., Ford, Anheuser-Busch, Dupont, Acer Computer, 
Bata International, and Seagrams) were started by founders who went on to build family 
empires.  Yet, the study of issues peculiar to the family business such as family/business 
interfaces and governance has not taken on the same level of importance as the more 
general entrepreneurship issues such as startup, growth, financing, etc.  For example, we 
know relatively little about the process and impact of succession planning in the family 
business.  Yet, no recurring event in the life of the family firm is more critical to survival 
than the transfer of power from the incumbent to the successor.  Entrepreneurial 
organizations are especially susceptible to loss of vision and purpose during periods of 
CEO transitions, as the leaders who helped shape the vision are replaced by others who 
may not share in the same values or abilities (Fiegener, Brown, Prince and File, 1996). 
Combine this with the fact that CEOs of smaller firms face fewer constrains than those in 
large firms, their decisions have proportionately greater and more immediately impact on 
the firm, such that the potential for making or breaking the firm is greater (Haveman, 
1993).  Thus, an understanding of how entrepreneur successors are formally and 
informally prepared to assume leadership is critical to our understanding of success, 
which argues for a need to focus on corporate governance issues, with particular attention 
paid to management succession. 
In the large public firm context, corporate governance is easily modeled as a 
response to the legal and fiduciary obligation of management as agents of the 
stockholder. Measures of CEO performance are thus unambiguous as they lead to 
shareholder wealth maximization.  Incentives and disincentives are used to encourage the 
right types of behaviors so that here, succession is often viewed as a result of corporate 
governance discipline processes (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Leighton and Thain, 1997).  
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mechanism whenever a CEO change is not the natural result of natural retirement, death 
or voluntary resignation of the incumbent.  In the field of corporate governance, 
relatively little (compared to say, M&A research) has been studied on non-disciplinary 
CEO turnover. In a family firm theoretically modeling corporate governance is not so 
easy because the combination of ownership and control calls into question the 
applicability of such standard theories of governance as agency theory.  In the family 
firm the principal, who also acts as his own agent, consumes the free cash flow.  Such 
consumption can take the form of economically inefficient strategic decisions (such as 
favoring lower risk strategies) because considerations for the interests of the family and 
its stakeholders are routinely enmeshed with those of the business.  Thus, studies of 
management succession in family firms represent a departure from traditional 
approaches, which use an agency, rational-adaptive or institutional theory view of 
succession as responses to the external environment (Bommer and Ellstrand, 1996). 
It is needless to say that succession plays a central role in family businesses. 
Many writers consider it the most important issue in family-business management and of 
great strategic significance to family firms (Sharma, Chrisman, and Chua, 1997; Handler, 
1994; Harris, Martinez, and Ward, 1994; Barach, Gantisky, Carson and Doochin, 1988).  
Past research suggests that only 30 percent of family firms survive into the second 
generation of family ownership, and 15 percent into the third (Morris, 1997).  In Asia 
many such companies are still run by their founders but are increasingly facing the 
transition event.  Heretofore, most studies on management succession have examined 
post-succession performance or the antecedents of the succession event (performance, 
strategic change, etc.)  Within the family business, much less is understood of succession 
as a process because it is complex and typically involves individual, relational and 
organizational levels of analyses (Handler, 1989).  For example, Handler (1991) 
examined at the impact of interpersonal relationships on succession in family firms and 
found that a key success factor in management succession is the level of mutual respect 
and understanding between current and next-generation family members.  The level of 
complexity increases if one extends this simple intergenerational analysis to other 
stakeholders in the firm.  There have also been few empirical studies done on succession 
planning, with the attendant antecedents and implications for corporate governance, 
strategy, effectiveness and performance.  The process of succession planning in family 
firms is closely tied to estate planning and the discharge of family responsibilities 
perceived by company management.  Therefore, in studying management succession in 
the family firm, one needs to focus on process, planning and the influence of the family.  
These three factors come together in the incumbent CEO/ founder.  In an entrepreneurial 
firm, strategic decision-making rests with the CEO and/or founder of the firm.  
Therefore, the attitude that this person has towards succession planning is critical to the 
effectiveness of the process and whether the plan represents a reasonable approximation 
of the family’s goals and objectives.  
Miller (1993) points out that a new CEO is often less experienced than an 
incumbent simply because he lacks the networks and understanding of the business that 
accrue from being at the top of a hierarchy.  The lack of experience will contribute to 
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while such activities may create a better atmosphere for change, they detract from the 
CEO’s short-term decision-making process.  Thus, a CEO that has been ‘groomed’ to 
take over may be less disadvantaged by the lack of experience versus one that was not 
prepared in a similar manner.  Furthermore, as a CEO becomes established, he would 
have built up the organizational networks and routines to ensure firm stability (Miller, 
1993).  These issues point to the importance of succession planning as an antecedent to 
promoting post-succession stability.  In small firms, stability is advantageous in that it 
promotes the efficient use of already scarce resources.  During a succession, these 
networks are threatened as the implied contracts between the CEO and various 
stakeholders are called into question.  The early identification and grooming of incoming 
CEOs reduces the disruption of implied contracts and therefore promotes post-succession 
organizational stability. 
In sum, this study argues for the importance of understanding the succession 
planning process in the family business by proposing and empirically verifying a model 
of succession planning and firm effectiveness. 
Literature Review 
In the literature, there has also been a noticeable lack of empirical studies on 
family businesses from a strategic point of view.  Partly, this can be attributed to the fact 
that this is a relatively new research perspective. Traditionally, family business is an area 
where various business consultants – accountants, financial planners, estate lawyers, and 
insurance agents – have been active. Different professional organizations have conducted 
surveys and case studies aimed at improving family business practices, in particular those 
related to estate and succession planning. While these preliminary efforts serve as good 
exploratory research work for developing insights for future studies, their results and the 
recommendations based on them require rigorous empirical testing at the construct level 
in order to ensure the generalizability of these models.   
Past research on succession has focused on the organizational and strategic 
antecedents of the event (White, Smith, Barnett, 1997).  In addition, most studies have 
characterized succession as a discrete event at a point in time.  Some of the questions 
asked in such studies have been on the impact of succession on post-succession 
performance (Carroll, 1984), the impact on organizational change (Tushman, Newman 
and Romanelli, 1986), the impact of CEO characteristics (Chaganti and Sambaryha 1987; 
Hambrick and Mason, 1984), and the impact on strategy (Smith and White, 1987; 
Helmich, 1974; Wiersema and Bantel, 1993).  There has been less attention paid to 
succession as a transition process over a period of time.  This approach is particularly 
salient in the context of the governance of the family firm.  Given that organizational 
strategy and family concerns are often intertwined in a family firm, critical decisions that 
impact the growth and continuation of the firm cannot be divorced from considerations of 
the founder’s goals for the family.   
  5Thus far, the family-business literature has been descriptive rather than normative 
and has focused on the nature, and characteristics of succession rather than the causes of 
failure or success.  According to a recent review article, which lists about one hundred 
studies on the strategic management of family businesses, virtually no attention was paid 
to the determinants of post-succession economic performance (Sharma, et al, 1997).  
Recently, Handler (1994) identified “characteristics of effective successions” as one of 
the five main streams of research on succession.  Effectiveness was defined as the 
smoothness of the transition rather than in terms of performance. In the literature, only 
one empirical study attempted to make the link between succession and firm performance 
(Morris, 1997).   
Where the literature has tended to treat succession as a process rather than as an 
event, life cycle models have often been used, suggesting that the succession process is 
part of the growth process of the firm.  Churchill and Hatten (1987), for example, 
proposed a life-cycle framework for the succession process between father and son in a 
family business. Similarly, Handler (1990) describes the succession process as one of 
mutual role adjustment between two generations. Studies like these place significant 
emphases on inter-generation relations without necessarily identifying the consequences 
of such relationships. The assumption seems to be that healthy family relationships will 
automatically translate into the smooth transfer of power and wealth, and, in turn, will 
naturally lead to good post-succession firm performance.    
Succession Planning 
Business founders often have difficulty giving up what they have created 
(Churchill and Lewis, 1983; Dyer, 1986; Kets de Vries, 1985).  Duffy and Stevenson, 
(1984) posit that succession planning is in direct conflict with the entrepreneur’s needs 
for control, power and meaning.  In that study, they found that 48.9% of Harvard-
educated entrepreneurs did not plan on retiring while a further 23.3% did not know when 
they would retire or even if they would retire after 65.  Although studies show that the 
founder generally assumes and desires that his sons will someday take over the 
management of the business, there is seldom any formal plan in place for the son to 
eventually takeover (Berenbein, 1984; Ward, 1987; Handler, 1989).  In many cases, 
founders fail to prepare for succession by simply ignoring the need to explicitly choose or 
groom a successor (Schein, 1985).  The entrepreneur’s resistance to succession planning 
is illustrated by Atchley’s (1989) study on retirement.  Retirement is threatening because 
it represents a change from the continuity of one’s daily routine (Sonnenfeld, 1988; 
Sheppard 1976).  Thus, there appears to be a contradictory phenomenon in which the 
founder appears to have a desire to see the business continue after him, but refuses to 
acknowledge that there will be indeed an endpoint to his career and thus ignores the need 
to plan for it.  Perhaps this dynamic accounts for the, oft-quoted, statistic that most 
businesses do not survive to the next generation and very few make it to the third 
(Morris, 1997).   
It has been generally assumed that one of the most significant factors determining 
the continuity of the family firm is whether the succession is planned and how well it is 
planned (Kirby and Lee, 1996).  Traditionally, these issues tend to be treated as either 
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considered both.  For example, there seems to be a consensus that good succession 
planning includes a comfortable time horizon for the transition between generations.  
Schulman (1991) and Zaudtke and Ammerman (1997) suggest that families start planning 
for the transfer of ownership and managerial responsibility five to twenty years in 
advance of the anticipated event.   
Recommendations on how the successor should be appointed vary but most 
suggest that the decision not be the founder’s alone, and that some type of planning team 
be created to oversee the process (Applegate, 1994; Sharma, et al., 1997).  Jaffe (1993), 
Davis (1992), and Osborne (1991) advocate the use of a board of advisers populated with 
outside directors, or at least a family council, in order to shift the burden of decision-
making from a single person to the group, thereby attenuating bias and increasing 
objectivity.   
Schulman (1991) and Fox, Nilakant, and Hamilton (1996) emphasize the need for 
candid, open communication using formal and informal family get-togethers throughout 
the succession planning process.  They further recommend that such communication 
extend beyond the incumbent and successor to include the constructive participation of 
key stakeholders. While such conventional wisdom may have oversimplified the 
complexity of the issue, there should be no doubt that an “open policy” differs 
significantly from a “closed-door approach” in terms of personal emotions, family 
relations, and the smoothness of transition. 
From the standpoint of implementing the succession process, whether a 
succession plan is written or not makes a difference. In 1995 Life and Health Insurance 
Sales conducted a large-scale survey of family business owners across the United States 
and found that 53% had written estate plans, while only 28% had written succession 
plans.  The survey also revealed that lawyers were more involved as experts than 
accountants.  Other researchers have mentioned the need for a shareholder’s agreement to 
balance management, ownership, and family interests (Schulman, 1991).  Such 
agreements, often with buyout clauses, reduce the possibility of future disputes during 
transition among major shareholders, and ensure the longevity of the firm (Magrath, 
1988).  Similar to shareholders’ agreements, estate plans have been advocated by 
Zaudtke and Ammerman (1997).  Estate plans are aimed at mitigating any tax and 
financial impacts on the firm resulting from the death of the owner.  Such plans often 
include a personal component dealing with the financial future of the owner himself. It 
has been suggested that one of the reasons of resistance to succession planning is the 
owner’s sense of insecurity, stemming from not having a clear post-succession income 
plan (Aronoff and Ward, 1992).  
The succession planning process is lengthy, complicated, and is not only 
emotionally challenging, but also expensive. One account estimates that a complex estate 
and succession plan can cost as much as $100,000 (Applegate, 1994). To most family 
firms this constitutes a substantial investment, which must be justified in economic terms.   
For example, a previous study on the relations between the characteristics of strategic 
  7planning systems and planning effectiveness found a positive correlation between the 
level of resources committed to planning and planning effectiveness, suggesting that 
planning resources may be viewed as investments with a delayed payback (Ramanujam 
and Venkatraman, 1987).   
Preparation of the Successor 
A critical part of the succession process concerns the grooming of the successor 
(Fiegener et. al., 1996).  As stated earlier, experience and grooming can decrease the 
likelihood of failure when one generation succeeds the next.  Yet, research seems to show 
that very few successors are explicitly identified and fewer are prepared in advance to 
assume the founder’s mantel.  A majority of the literature in this area appears to focus on 
two things: competence and legitimacy. Competence refers to operational know-how, 
while legitimacy deals with relational skills. The study by Barach et al. (1988) indicates 
that 90% of executives interviewed advocate a succession strategy in which a newcomer 
earns credibility by gaining the necessary experience to do the job better than anyone 
else.  There are two ways for the successor to earn legitimacy. One is to start from the 
bottom of the company and accumulate actual experience by working up the corporate 
ladder (Sales, 1990). The other is to obtain substantial external experience before joining 
the company (Stevens, 1990).  Furthermore, the substance of a successor’s experience 
may also make a difference to his or her legitimacy.  For example, Norburn and Birley 
(1988) found that different functional experience (output vs. throughput) in members of 
the top management team has implications on corporate performance. Although that 
study was targeted at large corporations, one could surmise similar patterns in family 
firms. However, despite expert opinion on the necessity of external experience, a recent 
empirical study by Fiegener et. al. (1996) revealed that CEOs in family firms do not  
consider prior experience to be an important form of preparation.  Another study found 
the “duo” mode of top management succession the most common (Vancil, 1987). Here, 
two top-level executives, a chairman and a CEO, share power, with the latter eventually 
succeeding the former.  Such a structure implies that the legitimacy of the successor is 
partly derived from the successor’s prior position as second-in-command  
It is also from the position of second-in-command that the chosen heir is more 
likely to be involved in strategic planning, an experience considered critical for success 
(Ward, 1988).  The study by Fiegener et al. (1996), however, finds that unlike non 
family-related CEOs, family-related CEOs rate this particular task among the least 
important of preparations for the successor, possibly because of their preference for 
maintaining rigid, and personal control over the direction of the business during their 
tenures.  The most significant finding in Fiegener, et al. (1996) is that family-related 
CEOs placed more emphasis on their successors’ “managing relations with customers 
and vendors” and “managing relations with stockholders and lenders” than their non 
family-related counterparts. Thus, they prefer a more direct and internally oriented 
approach by their successors in preparing for the CEO role, one that emphasizes building 
strong personal relationships among the stakeholders. 
The same study also found that non family-related CEOs were more externally 
oriented and emotionally detached from the succession process. Their favored forms of 
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seminars and university-level coursework. The literature suggests that the formal 
educational qualification of the successor is not a priority to most family-related CEOs. 
An inter-industry study on the relationship between founder experience and firm 
performance (Dyke, Fischer, and Reuber, 1992) failed to find any positive correlation 
between the level of education and various firm performance measures.  
Despite the lack of empirical support, which can be attributed to poor data or 
study design, there is still a strongly held belief among the community of labor 
economists and organizational scholars that educational and functional experience 
enhances on-the-job performance (Becker, 1993).  Education provides the basis for 
building general human capital, manifested in aptitude, potential, motivation and 
cognitive capacity (Becker, 1993; Hambrick and Mason, 1984) while functional 
experience provides the basis for building specific human capital that is particularly 
valuable in an organizational context (Becker, 1993).  Becker (1993) observed that ‘most 
investments in human capital – such as formal education, on-the-job training, or 
migration – raise observed earnings at older ages…’ (Human Capital, page 245).  
Experience is a fundamental condition for learning and therefore, is always expected to 
have a positive impact on job performance (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Armstrong, 
Pecotich and Mills, 1993).  This implies that new CEOs who are groomed for the job 
would be more likely to succeed that those who have not been groomed.   
The Transition Process  
Succession can be achieved in two ways: transfer of ownership and transfer of 
managerial responsibility. In this study, we assume that family business owners would be 
unlikely to relinquish both ownership and managerial responsibility at the same time. On 
the contrary, the succession process usually begins with a partial transfer of managerial 
responsibility with succession actually occurring when the other assumes the role of 
Chief Executive Officer.  Thus, succession is seen both as a process as well as an event.  
This feature is unique to our study, and we hope to show that by modeling succession in 
this manner, we are able to capture a richer set of relationships and causal effects on 
performance.  An indicator of a successful transition is thus the timely hand over of 
managerial responsibilities, including the final assumption of the CEO position (Rachlin, 
1985; Magrath, 1988).   
Although the transfer of ownership is not a criterion for succession, it has been 
associated with success. To ensure a smooth transition, a founder can strengthen the 
share-holding position of the successor, which suggests that the treatment of the heirs 
should be fair rather than equal.  This means that the share equity should only be gifted or 
sold to those responsible for running the firm (Davis, 1992; Magrath, 1988).  Assets 
outside of the business, such as real estate, should go to inactive heirs. Along this line of 
reasoning, the portion of ownership transferred from the founder to the successor can be 
used as an indicator of the effectiveness and smoothness of transition. Even if ownership 
is successfully transferred, tension can still exist if one or more contenders for the CEO 
position remain on the management team. Tension is a sign that the successor has not 
secured full legitimacy in the family firm, and firm performance in the future is likely to 
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succession may indicate reluctance by the owner to let go.  Such reluctance may result 
from a sense of insecurity, so that if a post-succession financial program for the owner is 
in existence, it may attenuate the owner’s lack of confidence in his or her successor.  
Succession and Business Strategy 
There has been a good history of research on the impact of CEO succession on 
firm strategy (Smith and White, 1987; Hambrick and Mason, 1984).  The extant research 
has found that succession is often accompanied by significant strategic change (Carroll, 
1984; Tushman, Newman and Romanelli, 1986; Wiersema and Bantel, 1993). Strategic 
refocusing can result from a succession event is triggered by poor firm performance, 
which can lead to an improvement in the deployment of corporate resources (Chaganti 
and Sambaryha 1987; Helmich, 1974).  There has been little research on the connection 
between successful strategy and succession planning, in part because the interactions can 
be complex.  Using a systems approach to viewing the family firm (Bowman, 1988), it is 
not unreasonable to assume that succession planning will also include explicit questions 
on the disposition of assets and the eventual deployment of corporate resources to deal 
with estate planning issues.  Thus, the decision to keep the firm in the family, sell it, or 
close it down will have an impact on the strategies the firm takes to position itself for its 
future role.  Therefore, it is conceivable that a firm’s strategic stance although not 
necessarily a result or cause of its succession plan, would have a significant interaction 
with the succession process and this will in turn impact firm effectiveness. 
  
Performance and Effectiveness 
Studies on the impact of succession on firm performance have been equivocal.  
Theoretically, there are three positions that one can take on this issue.  Succession can 
lead to better performance because the rational-adaptive approach argues that poor 
performance often induces succession.  The institutional approach argues that succession 
is disruptive and therefore can lead to poor performance.  Scapegoating theory posits no 
impact on performance because succession is merely a way for boards to pacify political 
forces demanding a ritual sacrifice for poor firm performance.  Thus, the root of poor 
performance is not defined and therefore there is no a priori reason why succession will 
lead to better performance.  Empirical research has been equivocal (Grusky, 1963; Brown 
1982; Pfeffer and Davis-Blake, 1986).  Within the family business literature, it is still 
unclear whether succession leads to better performance, in part because such longitudinal 
data is difficult to obtain.   
For our purpose, a family firm’s primary objectives include both business and 
family. Typical measures of business success are related to financial and growth 
outcomes.  We also know that in the U.S. alone, more than 420,000 businesses have 
failed in the ten years ending 1996, clearly implying that survival is just as important as 
profitability and market share (Goldberg, 1996). A firm survives by accumulating both 
capital resources and external and internal legitimacy (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  Thus, 
unless the business owner considers both business objectives and family goals together, 
the firm will not attain the support it needs to function internally.  Similarly, because 
  10outside stakeholders recognize the family firm as a combination of economic and family 
subsystems, any instability in the family will send negative signals, leading to uncertainty 
and cause the withdrawal of external stakeholder support for the business.  Thus, we 
argue that effectiveness, which includes financial both financial and family goals, rather 
than pure financial performance is a better outcome measure of succession planning.  
First, it is unlikely that planning per se will lead to better economic performance; other 
firm and industry related factors may be just as important. More importantly, planning is 
a necessary, though perhaps not sufficient condition, for good economic performance.  
Second, effectiveness includes the notion of support for the planning process and the 
plan. A resource dependence perspective would argue for legitimacy and support as a 
precondition for the adoption of any decision that will impact the eventual allocation of 
resources to stakeholders.  Thus, family support for the plan will determine the likelihood 
of its implementation and thus eventual success.  
It is technically difficult to measure the non-economic dimensions of family-firm 
performance. One has to resort to questionnaire methods and self-reported measures of 
satisfaction. Previous empirical research on this subject is virtually non-existing. Some 
writers (e.g. Friedman, 1986) have suggested several dimensions that define effective 
succession, including enhanced company reputation, reduced turnover, and increased 
financial performance. These criteria, however, are all business-related and do not reflect 
the effectiveness of the firm in achieving the objectives of the family. 
The Theoretical Model 
The preceding literature review suggests that to understand succession, the family 
business must be viewed as a set of subsystems.  Indeed, Bowman (1988) describes a 
family business as consisting of two subsystems--a task system, which is the business, 
and a sentient system, the family.  Thus, although they may not be equal in priority for 
the owner, there will always be two sets of goals for a family business even though they 
(a largely economic one for the business and a relational one for the family) may be in 
conflict. For example, a study by Riordan and Riordan (1993) discovered the widespread 
use of business resources to achieve family goals in small family firms. The implication 
of this is that the financial performance of a family firm may not be reflective of the 
firm’s effectiveness in achieving its overall objectives.  For our purposes, we view the 
firm as having three subsystems: the family, economic and social subsystems.  Using the 
resource dependence approach we discussed in the previous section, we posit the 
existence of a social subsystem as this represents the interface between the firm and its 
social environment.  It is from the social environment that legitimacy and status is 
conferred to the business and the family subsystems.  
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
In Figure 1, the family subsystem interacts with the economic one via the 
exchange of resources.  The family is often the first source of financial and human 
  11resources to the firm.  In turn, the residual from production returns to the family, where 
relationships are held together by the fair disbursement of economic wealth, so that it can 
achieve its goals of security and stability.  The economic or business subsystem interacts 
with the social one in that the business exists in contemplation of the law, community 
expectations and legitimacy.  A resource dependence perspective regards the social 
legitimacy of a business a key condition for its long-term survival.  For example, the 
withdrawing of legitimacy for tobacco companies has put into question their long-term 
prospects, causing many to diversify their businesses into less controversial industries.  
The family subsystem interacts with the social subsystem because both systems are based 
on relational, rather than transactional, exchange.  These relational exchanges are long 
lasting, pervasive and self-reinforcing.  The family derives social legitimacy, recognition 
and status from the social subsystem while the social subsystem often derives economic 
resources from the family.  The incidence of family connected charitable organizations 
(e.g., the Gates Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the Rockefellers Foundation, the 
Carnegie Foundation, etc.) testify to the tight linkages between the family and the 
community.  A systems view of the family firm implies that business decisions are often 
intertwined with family and social conditions so that business strategy cannot be 
understood in full without considering parallel effects on the other two subsystems.  This 
also implies that performance is difficult to measure and in trying to measure it, we have 
to allow for multidimensionality of purpose and outcome.  Finally, a systems approach 
also suggests that interaction effects have to be taken seriously, as these will have a 
significant impact on outcome.   
As discussed before, very few studies have empirically linked succession 
planning to performance. In a recent study, Morris (1997) developed a causal model of 
post-succession performance as a function of characteristics of the transition, and the 
transition, in turn, as a function of three groups of variables--preparation of heirs, nature 
of family and business relationships, and planning and control activities. In this study, we 
posit a theoretical model of the family firm that leads to a research model (Figure 2), 
which says that succession planning and its interaction with strategy and successor 
preparedness will correlate with effectiveness. 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
Note that while this model is a step forward in understanding succession 
performance, in that it tries to model the antecedents to effectiveness, it has the same 
shortcomings as previous endeavors (Venkatraman, 1989). These have been discussed by 
Sharma, et al. (1997), who point out that “No one appears to have investigated how much 
of the subsequent performance of a family business is determined by the succession 
process and how much by the successor. In family business research, this issue seems to 
be too important to be left as an assumption.” 
In our research model three determinants of effectiveness are posited. One 
contains dimensions that describe the preparedness of the successor. The other contains 
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The third describes the economic, family and social goals contemplated by the business 
owner.  Preparedness of the succession plan is the independent variable while successor 
preparedness and goals are the partial moderators.  We posit a separate and independent 
effect by the latter constructs on effectiveness, in addition to their moderating effects. 
Thus, effectiveness of the succession is directly and indirectly determined by succession 
planning, the preparedness of the successor and goals.  
The model, therefore, consists of five hypotheses represented by the arrows in 
Figure 2. In simple terms, a well-planned succession process will lead to a smooth 
transfer of managerial responsibilities from one generation to the next, producing 
superior firm performance and effectiveness (defined as satisfaction by stakeholders of 
the succession process). In addition to this, the preparedness of the successor, quite apart 
from the plan, will have an interaction effect with the comprehensiveness of the plan to 
produce superior performance and effectiveness.  As discussed earlier, we also expect the 
firm’s goals to have a moderating impact on succession planning such that it can either 
enhance performance or degrade it.  Thus, good post-succession firm performance is not 
only a result of a smooth transition, but also a function of preparedness of the successor. 
Methodology 
Variable definitions 
For this study, two control variables were used.  First was firm size, which was 
measured as the natural log of the number of employees.  Size has been found to be a 
significant correlate with many dimensions of an organization’s structure and strategy.  
Next was country of origin.  Here, we expect that tradition and national culture would 
play an important role in how founders viewed the role of the family, business and social 
relationships between the subsystems.   
Next the preparedness or comprehensiveness of the succession plan was measured 
as a 5-point Likert scale constructed from the following factors: whether a successor has 
already been chosen, a formal written plan in place, a board of advisors was involved in 
the process, the business owner has thought about the educational and training 
qualifications of his successor.  Thus, the more formal and comprehensively thought 
through the succession plan (with an identified successor and written plan) the more 
comprehensive it is.  
From the literature review, we measured preparedness of the successor as his or 
her experience (in years) in the family firm and other firms, and the level of formal 
business and technical education.  Finally, to measure family firm goals, a multiple item 
scale derived from the literature and initial field interviews with a small number of family 
business owners was constructed, which tapped into both business as well as family and 
social goals (Table 1).  These items were factors analyzed and orthogonally rotated to 
produce four constructs namely family and social goals, low cost strategy and 
differentiation strategy goals.  As can be seen in Table 1, there appears to be face validity 
of the constructs.  The confirmatory factor analysis and the resulting reliability analysis 
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data analysis (Nunnally, 1978). 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
The effectiveness of the succession plan was measured on a 5-item Likert scale of 
stakeholders’ (family members, suppliers, investors, and the board of directors or 
advisors) satisfaction with the succession plan.  Firm performance was measured in two 
ways, growth in sales and a self-reported measure of relative performance on 5 
dimensions (quality, profitability, reputation, innovation, and market share).  Although 
the relative measure of performance was self-reported, because it was anchored to 
specific ranges (top 10%, top 20%, mean, bottom 20%, bottom 10%), the problem of 
percept-percept bias, the most severe kind of common method variance problem, was 
minimized.  In addition, comparisons of respondents’ reports of sales and employee size 
against published sources of information from the original database did not indicate 
widespread bias, which led to greater confidence in the self-reported scores.  A 
Kolmorogorov-Smirnoff (K-S) 2-sample test was used to assess the hypothesis: Ho: 
Xrespondent = Xnon-respondent. 
Data 
Part of the opportunity inherent in this type of research question is the broad 
appeal to owners and managers of SMEs.  This appeal is cross border as the same types 
of problems faced by family firms everywhere are similar. In order to make the study 
generalizable, and to control for cultural and national specific factors that may 
systematically impact family business succession processes, a decision was taken to 
obtain the sample from a cross-national population of family firms with the appropriate 
country-of-origin controls in place.   
For this study, data was collected through mailed questionnaires targeting family 
firms in two countries (Hong Kong SAR, and Canada). Family firms were defined as 
independent companies with at least 50% of ownership controlled by one family, and at 
least 50% of the senior management team from one family. These firms were identified 
through government databases on the basis of one of the following two criteria: (1) the 
name of the company suggests that the firm is family-controlled (e.g. Brosz and 
Associates), and (2) two or more members of the senior management team have the same 
family name. Additionally, random checks were made by telephone to confirm validity of 
the addresses and names on the list.  Furthermore, companies with fewer than fifteen 
employees were excluded since past research has shown that this group tends to be 
younger and therefore systematically different in the way they were managed and in the 
problems they faced. The mailing sample size was targeted at 500 firms per country.  In 
total, about 100 responses per country were received, which translated to a 20% response 
rate.  Further t-tests of the means were conducted to ensure that the responses between 
the two countries were comparable. 
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The questionnaire, first designed in English and then translated to Mandarin was 
structured for a comprehensive, cross-border study. Thus, the usual precautions related to 
cultural specific and national specific response biases are taken into consideration.  In 
addition, care was taken to ensure that scale of operation was comparable for firms across 
national boundaries, which meant an explicit consideration for currency exchange rates.  
The questionnaire was pre-tested with a small Canadian-based sample.  An initial scan of 
the data showed that the responses were mostly complete, indicating that the 
questionnaire was not confusing.  The final questionnaire was first administered in the 
Metro Toronto area in the Province of Ontario, Canada and subsequently administered in 
Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region of China.   
The survey questions are grouped into five categories. The first group consists of 
questions concerning the succession planning process. Respondents are asked whether 
there was a succession plan, it was a written plan, an estate plan was included, the plan 
was known to all parties, there was a shareholder’s agreement, and there was a financial 
security plan in force for the founder. Questions are also asked about the length of the 
planning process and the people involved, including consultants, attorneys and 
accountants. Who made the decision is also asked, with emphases on the number of 
decision-makers and the number of types of decision makers (family members, senior 
employees, consultants, lawyers, accountings).  
The second group deals with successor preparation. Questions are asked about the 
respondent’s educational background, and number of years of internal and external 
experience. Respondents are also asked to respond to how heavily they were involved in 
each of a set of activities before succession, such as running a division or functional area, 
and dealing with vendors or creditors.  The third group of questions probes the 
timeliness, completeness, and smoothness of the planning process and 
comprehensiveness of the plan. Respondents are asked about the percentage of ownership 
transferred to them from the founder at the time when they formally took over the title of 
CEO. Questions are also asked about the perceived adherence to a succession timetable, 
perceived level of support from family members and other stakeholders, perceived 
control over managerial responsibilities, and perceived roles of the founder and 
contenders for the CEO position.  
The fourth group has to do with post-succession performance of the firm, using 
both objective and subjective questions. Objective criteria include average sales and 
profit in the last three years, and average growth rates of sales, profit, and employment in 
the last three years. Industry and temporal variables, however, influence these indicators. 
Self-reported questions are included to reflect competitors’ relative performances.  The 
last group of questions is demographic and deals with company and respondent profile. 
The criteria of the sample will be enforced through questions regarding the company 
structure, composition of ownership, and number of employees. The questionnaire was 
designed to be completed by the owner/CEO of the firm and care was taken to ensure that 
this was complied with. A cover letter discusses the purpose of the survey and provides 
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the results provided they fill in and send back an enclosed postcard. 
The research model was tested using a combination of correlation analysis and 
hierarchical regression.  In the latter, control variables were entered prior to the 
independent variables to ascertain the contribution to variance explained by the 
independent variables.  Finally, the interaction terms were included to determine the 
variance explained contributed.  The final regression equation was then examined for 
significant relationships between the predictor and dependent variables in order to verify 
the relationships posited in the research model as laid out in Figure 2. 
Results 
Sample characteristics 
Since this is the first ever cross-border survey conducted on this research 
question, it is interesting to understand the sample characteristics.  Most of the companies 
that responded are from the manufacturing sector followed by service sector and then 
wholesale. There are more manufacturing respondents from Hong Kong than Canada, in 
terms of percentage to total responses.  Businesses in Canada were owned for an average 
of 27 years as compared to those in Hong Kong, which were younger at 22 years. More 
than 50% of the Canadian firms reported revenues of over C$5 million while 37% of the 
Hong Kong firms reported revenues in the same range (currency converted).  The 
average tenure of the respondent as CEO was about 16 years for the Canadian sub-
sample and about 14 years for the Hong Kong one.  Succession has not yet occurred in 
about 65% of the sample, while it had occurred once before in 25%. Similarly, 68% of 
the firms reported that they were first generation owner-managed while 25% reported 
that they were second generation firms.  The last statistic is in line with much of the 
research demonstrating that few firms survive beyond the second generation. In the 
Canadian sub-sample, 61% of the survey respondents were the firms’ founders while in 
the Hong Kong sample, 72% were founders.  On average about 30% of the respondents 
reported being a son or daughter of the founder.  In all cases, the respondents were the 
CEOs of their companies.  In terms of the retirements plans that owners had for their 
companies, 56% of the Canadians said they would likely pass the business to family 
members while only 49% of the Hong Kong owners said they would do so.  Surprisingly, 
fully 9% of the Canadian owners said they would likely close the firm while 10% of the 
Hong Kong sample said they would do so.  
Interestingly, more than 55% of the firms reported they had either a Board of 
Directors or Council of Advisors. There were on average 3 to 6 directors on each board 
with half of these being family members. Although the respondents were able to fully 
respond to questions on successor preparation (for example, most agreed that technical 
and management training and experience were important successors preparedness), 72% 
of the Canadian firms did not have written succession plans while more than 83% of the 
Hong Kong firms reported the same.  Interestingly, even without a written plan, more 
than 96% of the Canadian firms had already made their succession plans public to the 
family, for an average of 3 years, whereas only 72% of the Hong Kong firms did so. The 
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55%.  Additionally, about 23% of the plans in both sub-samples were formulated as a 
result of family meetings.  In 31% of the Canadian cases, a successor had already been 
chosen whereas only in 19% of the Hong Kong cases was this so.  For those who planned 
to keep the firm in the family, on average, about 80% of the successors would be a son or 
daughter while 18% would be a grandchild.  
Corporate governance and succession planning 
With regard to corporate governance issues and succession planning, Table 2 
reports the Pearson correlations between aspects of the governance structure of the firm 
and its succession planning practices.  While this is not central to the purpose of this 
study, it is instructive to understand how governance and succession planning are linked 
in order to understand the results of the hypotheses test.  In particular, we note that firms 
reporting the existence of a board of directors also reported less family meetings (-0.33, 
p<.000) suggesting that the board is a useful mechanism to separate the business 
subsystem from the family subsystem of the firm.  The advantages are obvious.  A 
separation of both systems ensures that decisions taken in either system are not 
compromised by considerations for the other.  Thus, business decisions can be taken to 
maximize economic outcome, which provides the necessary resources for the family 
system to optimize its outcome as well.   The data reports that the number of family 
meetings also produced more acceptable succession plans (0.24, p<.001).  Thus, the 
intersection between family and business is still best managed within the family, rather 
than in the boardroom.  This suggests that a succession plan reflects the decisions 
impacting the family-business interface.  It is also clear from the data that smaller 
companies were less likely to have a formal board of directors or advisors (-0.28, 
p<.000), in part because the cost of doing so (paperwork, fees and other compensation, 
etc.) can be high relative to the size of the firm.  Table 2 also reports significant 
relationships between country-of-origin and various aspects of succession planning and 
corporate governance.  For example, Canadians were more prone to estate planning 
(0.35, p<.000) and shareholder agreements (0.19, p<.01), yet reported less succession 
preparedness (-0.41, p<.000).   
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
There was a high correlation between estate planning and the existence of 
shareholder agreements (0.45, p<.000) but a negative one to preparedness (-0.35, p<000).  
This seems to suggest that succession preparedness goes much further than simple estate 
planning but that owners often confused the two.  Heretofore, much of the business 
succession planning literature has focused on estate planning and shareholder 
agreements.  This result suggests that we have to go beyond simple formulations of 
succession planning in family businesses as wealth transfer to include leadership 
transition as in the training of the successor.  It is also noteworthy that larger firms were 
more prepared for the succession event (0.30, p<.000), which demonstrates the amount of 
resources, in CEO attention and time, that are required for a well formulated plan. Also, 
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shareholder agreements (-0.17, p<.05) in favor of more comprehensive succession 
planning (0.22, p<.01).  As expected, succession preparedness was positively correlated 
with succession effectiveness (0.35, p<.000). 
Main correlations 
Table 3 reports the Pearson correlations for the variables in the study.  Most 
notable are the correlations between succession effectiveness and the interaction between 
succession preparedness and family goals (-0.17, p<.05), and preparedness and successor 
experience (0.33, p<.000).  Also, the correlations between relative performance and 
business strategies (low cost: 0.15, p<.05; differentiation: 0.36, p<.000), social goals 
(0.26, p<.000), succession preparedness (-0.29, p<.000), and the interactions between 
preparedness and differentiation strategy (0.33, p<.000), family goals (0.17, p<.05), 
social goals (0.26, p<.000) and experience (-0.17, p<.05) confirms an earlier discussion 
on the complexity in the succession planning and effectiveness equation. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
Table 3 also reports a negative correlation between succession effectiveness, 
which was previously defined as satisfaction of the firm’s stakeholders with the 
succession plan and planning process, and revenue growth (-0.24, p<.001), although there 
was a strong positive correlation between relative performance and revenue growth (0.33, 
p<.000).  This is an interesting result because it suggests a fundamental incompatibility 
between economic and family goals.  Thus, succession plans that had the support of the 
firm’s stakeholders did not necessarily translate into better short-term performance in the 
marketplace.  It is this fundamental conflict that continues to dog family business owners, 
perhaps accounting for the high rate of failure during generational transitions. 
Tests of the theoretical model 
Table 4 reports the hierarchical regression analyses for the independent variables 
on each of the dependent variables, relative performance, succession effectiveness and 
revenue growth.  First, notice that firm size reported a significant relationship to the 
dependent variables in all three models.  There were also significant relationships 
between country of origin and relative performance and revenue growth but not with 
succession effectiveness.  Part of the relationship may be attributed to industry specific 
influences in the countries of origin.  In all, the control variables explained between .016 
and .177 of the total variance.  The addition of the independent variables increased this to 
between .096 and .296.  In two of the three models, the predictor variables registered 
significant changes in variance explained (.119 for relative performance and .104 for 
succession effectiveness).  In all three models, succession preparedness accounted for 
much of the additional variance explained while goals accounted for the additional 
variance explained in the relative performance model.  Finally, the addition of the 
interaction terms did not seem to increase the variance explained significantly.  
Additional variance explained varied from .00 to .022.  In total, all three models reported 
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succession planning, business and family goals all had statistically significant 
relationships with effectiveness and performance.  Table 5 reports that all three models 
were statistically significant at the .000 level. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
Turning to Table 5, we examine these relationships more carefully to verify the 
theoretical model.  First, notice that there were generally little significant relationships 
between the interaction terms and the dependent variables.  Only with respect to 
succession effectiveness did a significant positive relationship occur between succession 
preparedness and successor experience (t=2.44, p<.015).  Thus, in firms that reported a 
high level of succession preparedness, the addition of successor experience 
(preparedness) disproportionately increases the degree of stakeholders’ satisfaction with 
the succession plan.  This is a noteworthy finding because it seems to suggest that 
stakeholders to a succession plan are very concerned about the stability that an 
experience successor can bring and the increased likelihood that experience will ensure 
the full and complete implementation of the succession plan. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
Table 5 reports that firms pursuing either a low cost (t=2.11, p<.05) or 
differentiation (t=2.72, p<.01) strategy (the factors were orthogonally rotated) were also 
more likely to report higher levels of relative performance.  This is simply congruent 
with traditional strategic management positioning models a la Porter (1980).  What is 
more interesting is the lack of significant relationships between family and social goals 
with effectiveness or performance.  Again, this seems to suggest that the explicit pursuit 
of non-economic goals hinders rather than enhances the fulfillment of family objectives.  
Instead, firms that keep their focus on pursuing a pure business strategy are able to 
generate enough resources to allow family and social goals to be met outside of the 
context of the business subsystem. 
Table 5 also reports a positive and significant relationship between succession 
preparedness and effectiveness (t=1.82, p<.10).  Thus, explicit considerations for a 
formal plan and the selection of a successor contributed greatly to reducing uncertainty 
and thus increased stakeholders’ satisfaction.  In two of the three models, successor 
preparedness, defined as a successor having worked in the family firm or similar 
companies for a period of time and the level of his formal education was positively 
correlated with relative performance (t=1.71, p<.10) and revenue growth (t=1.95, p<.05).  
Thus, there is a clear economic impact on grooming a successor such that he or she takes 
an active role in the firm before taking over the mantle of leadership.  
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reporting variance explained of between .09 (F=2.35) to .303 (F=6.90).  In total there 
were 204 valid cases in the regression models.  Standard checks for outliers, 
heteroscedasticity, and normality did not reveal any problems with the regression models. 
Discussion 
Although the regression models did not report many statistically significant 
relationships, those variables that were significant accounted for a high degree of 
variance explained, suggesting that we are on the right track.  Taken together, the 
research model (Figure 2) received some support. In particular, we note that the variable 
we introduced to the literature, comprehensive succession planning (or in the short form, 
succession preparedness) was significantly related to effectiveness, which we earlier 
argued from a resource dependence perspective is critical to long term survival.  The 
significance of the interaction between successor preparedness (experience) and 
succession preparedness is also important because it does suggest that the impact of 
succession planning on effectiveness is multidimensional.  It may even be non-linear, 
although we did not test for second order effects in this model because we did not present 
an explicit theoretical rational for doing so.  However, it is conceivable that some 
experience, together with succession planning can lead to superior effectiveness because 
a smoother transition will likely reduce wasted resources.  On the other hand, long tenure 
in the family business, coupled with a formalized succession plan may result in the 
successor simply being crowned, which while guarantees the most stable transition 
outcome, can lead to myopia in strategic decision making and over-commitment to a 
certain direction.  In such a case, the ‘shadow of the founder’ is not easily shaken and 
while that can provide a degree of continuity, it can also militate against significant and 
perhaps critical change. 
Clearly, more work needs to be done in this area.  Even though we believe that we 
captured all the relevant indictors of the succession preparedness (or planning 
comprehensiveness) construct, it would be useful to take these results back into the field 
to see how business owners react to it.  Some comments we received on the survey forms 
seem to indicate that a degree of dynamism may be missing in our constructs.  In 
particular, a number of respondents suggested that the strategic and business goals of the 
firm change over time as both the family and business grow and mature in parallel to 
each other.  This parallel dynamism was not capture in our model and therefore deserves 
further thinking.  It may be that family goals and strategic goals have an interactive effect 
with each other, which in turn has a third order interactive effect with succession 
planning to impact performance and effectiveness.  This type of recursive causal model is 
best tested using a causal modeling approach such as LISREL.  Unfortunately, we do not 
have a large enough sample with which to do this since each construct consists of a 
number of variable indicators, each requiring at least 10 cases for adequate statistical 
power.  Thus, this will have to wait until the sample size can be expanded and more data 
collected. 
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This study has attempted to examine a specific aspect of corporate governance in 
family businesses: the succession planning process.  Using a theoretical model, partially 
based on resource dependence theory that asserts legitimacy accorded by the firm’s 
stakeholders is critical to organizational survival, the study sought to empirically test an 
interactive relationship between goals, successor experience and planning 
comprehensiveness on performance.  In order to render the results generalizable, a 
decision was taken to extend the study across national boundaries.  From the standpoint 
of the empirical test, the results provided some, though not unequivocal support for the 
theoretical model.  Certainly the results did not contradict the model but neither did it 
provide full support.  The most significant support it provided was to affirm the 
relationship between succession planning and firm effectiveness, which deserves further 
study.  In particular, it would be useful to investigate second and third order interactions 
between succession planning, strategy and successor experience. 
The study did not look at the role played by the board of directors or advisors 
beyond the simple relationships between board presence on the existence of formal 
succession planning.  The results did raise a notion that formalizing corporate governance 
in the family firm, but having a board effectively separates the business and family 
subsystems of the firm, which can lead to better business and family decisions.  However, 
more can be done in this area.  Specifically, the study can be extended to look at the 
impact of board size, board composition and board relationship with the founder on the 
succession planning process, effectiveness and business strategy.   
Finally, this study calls for the development of a recursive causal model.  Till 
now, much of the research, including this study, has been correlational and although a 
theoretical case can be made, and has been made in this study, for a causal direction in 
the correlations, it is important to explicitly test for this.  Two methods are possible.  The 
first is the standard longitudinal panel study but the second employs respondent recall 
data.  Here, sample selection is critical because only respondents that have just assumed 
leadership of the family firm can participate.  However, because the event is recent, recall 
accuracy is not compromised.  Thus, although the sample size is reduced using this 
method, the data will have less noise and therefore the statistical power of the test will be 
preserved.  
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  28Table 1: Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Goals
a
 




Social Goals  Family Goals 
Lowest Production/Service Delivery Costs  .804 .117      .016 .114
Find Lowest Cost Supplies/Raw Materials  .797        -.077 -.061 .064
Keeping Overhead Costs As Low As Possible  .759        .269 .141 .105
Maintaining Low Cost In Operations  .660        .235 .121 .106
Maintaining Good Relationships Suppliers  .470        .204 .396 -.073
Maintaining Sales Growth  .182  .708      .134 .282
Achieve Highest Quality Customer Service  .244  .705      .219 -.068
Improving Business Profitability  .200  .629      .209 .221
Excellence In Product Designs/Features  .278  .588      .382 -.156
Differentiating Products Or Services  -.042  .564      -.081 .184
Making Positive Contribution To Society  .047  .043  .800    .168
Servicing The Needs Of The Community  .016  -.047  .739    .348
Ensuring The Welfare Of Employees  -.055  .373  .583    .215
Hiring The Best Expertise Available  .210  .328  .550    -.076
Being Known As An Excellent Competitor  .107  .457  .491    -.025
Ensuring Financial Security For Family  -.019  .267  .149  .774 
Keeping The Business In The Family  .148  .077  .035  .747 
Maintaining Family Harmony  .183  .039  .341  .627 
Variance Explained  30.19  11.51  8.52  6.88 
Reliability  Alpha          .7878 .6445 .7503 .7036
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.  
                                                           
a Rotation converged in 10 iterations 
  29Table 2: Correlation of Succession Planning and Governance 
  
 
Pearson Correlation  
Sig. (2-tailed) 
1                  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
(1) Estate Plan Covering Disposal Assets  1.000
.
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1                                    2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1. Country  1.000 
. 
     











   



















   





























   




























































































































































































































































































































  31Table 4: Hierarchical Regression of Model 
 
  Dependent Variable  Relative Performance  Succession Effectiveness  Revenue Growth 
          B      Beta t Sig. B      Beta t Sig. B      Beta t Sig.
1 Country .541 .273 4.251 .000 .024 .010 .143  .937 .886 .238 3.542 .000
   Size -.223 -.292 -4.536 .000 .148 .161 2.287  .023 -.309 -.203 -3.027 .003
  R .430 .160   .336
  R Square .185 .025   .113
  Adjusted R Square .177 .016   .104
2    Differentiation  Strategy .280 .282 4.120 .000 -.161 -.134 -1.754 .081 .052 .026 .337 .736
   Family Goals .060 .061 .938 .350 -.074 -.062 -.853  .395 -.040 -.020 -.276 .783
   Low Cost Strategy .150 .151 2.562 .011 .017 .014 .215  .830 -.070 -.036 -.533 .595
   Social Goals .226 .228 3.501 .001 .0064 .001 .007  .994 .012 .006 .080 .937
   Succession Preparedness -.111 -.124 -1.767 .079 .389 .360 4.587  .000 -.253 -.142 -1.781 .077
   # Years Plan Made Public -.018 -.021 -.341 .734 .061 .057 .836  .404 .045 .026 .370 .712
   Who Made Choice Of Successor -.118 -.078 -1.278 .203 -.012 -.007 -.097  .923 -.211 -.070 -1.012 .313
   Successor Experience .032 .109 1.759 .080 .006 .017 .245  .807 .053 .093 1.315 .190
  R .575 .404   .375
  R Square .331 .163   .140
  Adjusted R Square .296 .120   .096
  Incremental R Square .119 .104   .000
3  Preparedness x Differentiation -.047 -.126 -.827 .410 .031 .069 .408 .683 -.149 -.200 -1.153 .250
   Prepardness x Family Goals .113 .328 1.579 .116 -.064 -.155 -.673  .502 .064 .094 .396 .692
   Preparedness x Low Cost -.076 -.224 -1.320 .188 -.051 -.123 -.655  .514 -.076 -.112 -.577 .565
   Preparedness x Social Goals .017 .049 .302 .763 -.029 -.072 -.400  .689 .014 .020 .107 .915
   Preparedness x Experience -.002 -.035 -.292 .771 .017 .324 2.444  .015 -.015 -.172 -1.261 .209
  R .595 .453   .397
  R Square .354 .205   .157
  Adjusted R Square .303 .142   .090
  Incremental R Square .007 .022   .000
 
  32Table 5: Regression of Complete Model 
 
Dependent Variable  Relative Performance  Succession Effectiveness  Revenue Growth 
  B      Beta t Sig.      B      Beta t Sig. B      Beta t Sig.
(Constant)  .527   1.037 .301 1.951   2.869  .005 2.171   1.877 .062
Country  .062 .031 .399 .690 .590 .247 2.840  .005 .811 .206 2.295 .023
Size  -.178 -.233 -3.742 .000 .058 .063 .914  .362 -.229 -.150 -2.112 .036
Differentiation Strategy  .409 .413 2.715 .007 -.261 -.219 -1.296 .197 .420 .213 1.226 .222
Family Goals  -.233 -.236 -1.225 .222 .130 .109 .511  .610 -.244 -.124 -.564 .573
Low Cost Strategy  .353 .356 2.107 .036 .164 .137 .733  .465 .126 .064 .331 .741
Social Goals  .167 .169 1.058 .291 .079 .067 .377  .707 -.030 -.015 -.083 .934
Succession Preparedness  -.072 -.080 -.881 .379 .198 .183 1.818  .071 -.110 -.062 -.596 .552
# Years Plan Made Public  -.002 -.003 -.050 .960 .031 .029 .403  .687 .092 .052 .704 .482
Who Made Choice Of Successor  -.118 -.078 -1.266 .207 -.030 -.016 -.242  .809 -.222 -.073 -1.048 .296
Successor Experience  .042 .147 1.707 .089 -.054 -.156 -1.638  .103 .110 .191 1.947 .053
Preparedness x Differentiation  -.047 -.126 -.827 .410 .031 .069 .408 .683 -.149 -.200 -1.153 .250
Prepardness x Family Goals  .113 .328 1.579 .116 -.064 -.155 -.673  .502 .064 .094 .396 .692
Preparedness x Low Cost  -.076 -.224 -1.320 .188 -.051 -.123 -.655  .514 -.076 -.112 -.577 .565
Preparedness x Social Goals  .017 .049 .302 .763 -.029 -.072 -.400  .689 .014 .020 .107 .915
Preparedness x Experience  -.002 -.035 -.292 .771 .017 .324 2.444  .015 -.015 -.172 -1.261 .209
R  .595 .453   .397
R Square  .354 .205   .157
Adjusted R Square  .303 .142   .090
    SS df MSq F SS df MSq F SS df MSq F
Regression    70.76 15 4.718 6.899 59.69 15 3.980 3.253 124.83 15 8.320 2.352
Residual 129.24 189 .684  231.23 189 1.223   668.73 189 3.538  
Total 200.00 204    290.93 204      793.53 204    
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